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Introduction
China’s growing presence in Africa has spawned many explanations of its political, economic cultural and other activities in the continent. A good deal of its interactions with African states involves arms sales and support 
for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. In its dealings with African states it 
deliberately tries to set itself apart from the West’s record of colonial rule and exploitation 
of the continent. China constantly reiterates and underscores its foreign policy of non-
interference in the affairs of African states. Nonetheless, it has not been able to escape 
the lure of the benefits that are associated with arms sales to Africa, plus its negative 
consequences, as well as the geopolitical ties that it enhances between China and Africa. 
Accordingly, the objective of this article is to analyze China’s seemingly contradictory 
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This article offers a critical analysis of the conflict and regional security 
implications of one of the strategies (arms sales) utilized by China to expand 
and consolidate its presence in Africa. This worrying trend is juxtaposed 
against its equally increasing peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in 
post-conflict states within the continent. The analysis, accordingly, argues 
that the simultaneous growth in the scope of arms transfers and increase in 
contributions to peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities is tantamount to 
a contradictory policy toward Africa. Arms sales to African states encourage 
some incumbent regimes to maintain their despotic and oppressive rule thereby 
increasing the probability of violent conflicts between regimes and opposition 
groups. Small arms also prolong civil wars because of the easy access to them. 
While Chinese arms have been implicated in many conflicts in Africa, China 
at the same time is also enhancing African Union peacekeeping activities 
through generous financial donations as well as participation in humanitarian 
assistance, national police training, and resettlement of ex-combatants, among 
other activities. The question is, why does China pursue these seemingly 
antithetical policies within Africa? Or, why does China play this contradictory 
role contrary to its narrative of noninterference in the internal affairs of other 
states? 
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arms transfers/military relationships with African countries and simultaneous active 
engagement in peacebuilding activities in African countries where its weapons have 
been implicated in bloodletting and war crimes in general. In other words, what are 
the geopolitical and geo-economic rationales for increasing Chinese arms transfers 
and military relationships with African nations in contrast to its contributions to UN 
peacebuilding efforts and support for African peacekeeping activities? How do arms 
transfers to African nations and involvement in peacebuilding activities portray China 
as playing contradictory roles in Africa? What are the conflict and peace implications 
for African countries of these seemingly contradictory activities by China?
 For a long time, arms transfers to Africa have been dominated by the US, 
Britain, France, and Russia (Grant 2012; Pierre, 1982. However, recent trends in 
Chinese industrialization and China’s growing scope of political, economic, and 
diplomatic activities may suggest that a fundamental shift in arms transfers to Africa 
may be occurring that, over time, could have important consequences for increased 
internal wars or peacekeeping operations in the continent.
The literature on arms transfers has long suggested that arms transfers to 
developing countries tend to widen the scope of violence and even intensify or increase 
the duration of wars thereby making the maintenance of peace more difficult (Klare 
2014; Sanders 1990; Schelling 2008). At times bilateral arms transfer relationships take 
the added form of arms production, whereby the supplier sets up arms production 
facilities in the recipient country.
Reasons for Antithetical Policies
The primary reason why China pursues these seemingly antithetical policies in Africa is found in its overall geo-strategy in the continent. This geo-strategy is a combination of geopolitical and geo-economic policies. The latter refers 
to the economic objective of ensuring access to Africa’s strategic resources, while the 
former refers to consolidating political ties with all African states, especially with 
the politically important ones. First, China sees African states such as Kenya, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, among 
others, as countries with which to engage in lucrative trade (hence arms sales) as part 
of its geo-economic rivalry with the West. At the same time there are countries in 
Africa that need peacebuilding and peacekeeping assistance because of ongoing civil 
wars or postwar reconstruction. Accordingly, China participates in both peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding activities which help to strengthen its geopolitical ties with these 
African states. These humanitarian activities present opportunities for China to put 
into practice its frequent pronouncements that it is a friend of Africa. 
 China’s policy of non-interference in human rights within the recipient country 
makes it an attractive and willing source of weapons for African countries. Since 
many African countries attempt to break free of Western rules and regulations about 
arms procurement, they turn to China which does not burden them with external 
impositions associated with arms transfers and production, such as human rights, or 
democratic ideals. Besides, where an arms production facility/factory is set up within 
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a developing country, it tends to bolster morale and a sense of independence and 
autonomy in military hardware. In other words, a domestic arms production facility 
reduces a country’s dependence on more developed countries. More arms production 
autonomy inevitably means less dependence on major suppliers, at least, for small 
arms or light weapons. Moreover, apart from the determination by African countries 
to lessen dependence on Western suppliers, they also want to ensure reliability and 
consistency of supply. The major arms suppliers often impose embargos on arms sales 
to countries whose policies they find objectionable. For instance, the US often makes 
human rights issues a key criterion in determining US military aid and sales. China, on 
the other hand, does not use human rights and democracy as criteria for transferring 
arms to African countries. Many resolutions are passed in the UN Security Council, or 
by Western governments barring the sale of weapons to governments engaged in wars 
against rebel groups or neighboring states. Furthermore, China’s Africa policy is also 
one that provides benefits and employment opportunities for skilled Chinese citizens 
(Baah and Jauch 2009; Lynch 2012). This is an example of China’s geo-economic 
objective in Africa. By establishing arms factories, and training Africans to use the 
more sophisticated weapons they supply, skilled Chinese such as scientists, engineers, 
and industrial managers are offered more opportunities for applying their skills and 
knowledge. The interaction between African and Chinese skilled workers, it is hoped, 
would produce better understanding between the two in competition with the West. In 
addition, China’s arms industry, just as the arms industries of other nations, is designed 
to be both a military and economic asset. For an arms industry to be sustainable it 
has to be profitable, thus the need for arms exports to other nations. The revenue 
generated from arms exports feeds into research and development for new and better 
weapons systems. This is especially the case with China where the government with 
its State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is the key, if not the sole, exporter of weapons 
to developing countries (SIPRI 2011). Arms exports are therefore an economic 
imperative, and a sine qua non for maintaining an arms industry. Besides, Chinese 
arms find a ready market in some African countries that consider themselves, or would 
like to be perceived as regional influentials. Countries such as Nigeria in West Africa, 
Kenya in East Africa, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Africa, 
among others, fall into this category. Still others import Chinese arms in order to feed 
the conflicts in the DRC, Sudan, Central African Republic, among others. While arms 
transfers during the Cold War were predicated largely on the need to supply warring 
factions in civil wars, or proxy wars, or post-independence struggles for power, today 
regime survival or incumbent regime efforts fuel arms transfers. The coercive military 
balance between regime and dissidents is determined largely by the access to a steady 
supply of weapons.
 The Chinese arms transfer rationales have undergone change in response to 
changes in power political and economic competition in the international system 
(Caldwell 2015). In particular, during the era of political ideological rivalry between 
communism and capitalism, China supplied weapons to both state and non-state 
revolutionary actors with the aim of bolstering Maoism and China’s national interests. 
The focus was largely ideological and not motivated by profit. Currently, in this era 
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of economic globalization and commercial competition, Chinese arms serve more 
of a profit motive (Mullen 2016). In its arms relationship with African nations, arms 
sales have more commercial and political bases and thereby promote both the geo-
economic and geopolitical goals of Africa.
China’s Multidimensional Approach in Africa
This analysis focuses on China’s contradictory policies of arms sales/military cooperation and peacebuilding/peacekeeping activities in African nations. This in no way asserts that China alone is responsible for the sale of weapons 
to sub-Saharan African nations. However, while arms sales and peacebuilding 
activities may seem contradictory policies, they are an integral aspect of China’s 
multidimensional approach to Africa which includes activities such as agriculture 
and health training, educational cooperation, mineral investments, infrastructure 
development, telecommunications services, and military cooperation, among many 
others. This approach has inevitably led to the seeming contradictions between the 
simultaneous expansion of arms sales and peacekeeping activities. In fact for a long 
time, the foremost arms suppliers to Africa have been the US, France, Britain, and 
Russia. In terms of largest world arms suppliers, China was for a long time not among 
the five top global suppliers. It was only in 2010 that it ranked among the top five 
suppliers occupying the position of third largest weapons supplier (SIPRI 2011). China 
has realized that in order to achieve its geo-strategic and economic ambitions it needs 
to be more competitive with the leading arms suppliers, the US, Britain, Germany, 
France, and Russia. Its increasing competitiveness may in large part be due to its arms 
sales to sub-Saharan African states. Its ongoing geo-political and economic objectives 
in African countries have, at the same time, widened and even strengthened its arms 
trade with African states.
 China’s growing penchant for increasing its arms sales to Africa is driven by 
both domestic factors as well as external imperatives of economic globalization—in 
this latter case is the need to compete with the foremost global arms suppliers, the 
US, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany in particular. The domestic factors that may 
be largely responsible for China’s arms transfer to Africa are: (1) the Chinese state’s 
inability to regulate or monitor all arms exports from China; (2) China’s arms sales 
to African nations of geopolitical and geo-economic importance to China in Africa, 
such as Sudan and Zimbabwe; and (3) the freedom of trade that comes with economic 
liberalization in China which has spawned many private enterprises, some of which 
are engaged in arms transfer purely for the profit motive. These internal–external 
factors responsible for China’s arms transfer to Africa are driven by what could be 
referred to as the globalization imperative. This last reason is directly related to the fact 
that many Chinese enterprises with close ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
no longer benefit from that symbiotic relationship. The (PLA) formally divested itself 
from commercial operations after Jiang Zemin called for the dissolution of China’s 
military-business complex (Hyer 1992; Taylor and Wu 2012). Military acquiescence to 
divestiture was contingent on generous compensation from Beijing as well as allowing 
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the PLA to pursue profits via arms sales. Accordingly, it currently exercises strong 
influence over defense-related enterprises and searches for its own arms export markets. 
The exposure of defense companies to more independent commercial management is 
driven by the need for China to compete with the major arms suppliers. Most of the 
profits earned remain with these companies while a portion goes to the Ministry of 
Finance. The result is that the PLA no longer receives profits from civilian enterprises 
and now relies to a large extent on arms sales. The need to increase profits from arms 
sales result in selling weapons that escape the scrutiny of the state. Consequently, the 
vigorous search for markets in Africa is the result of necessity by the PLA to regain its 
lost domestic commercial profits via external commercial arms relationships.
The dissolution of China’s military business complex, it could be argued was a 
deliberate policy to ensure that the country becomes more competitive in arms sales 
relative to other major powers. What the policy did, is to privatize its arms industry and 
open it to domestic competition among Chinese firms. Many of China’s privately owned 
firms entered the African market and thereby acted as competitors to firms from other 
major countries. However, because of China’s non-conditional policy of arms sales, it 
was not long before Chinese weapons were implicated in atrocities in Sudan, especially 
Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Liberia, and Zimbabwe, among others. 
In order to quell the growing negative image of itself in Africa because of its support of 
despotic regimes through arms sales, it expanded its peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
activities in the continent. Its involvement in increased peacekeeping was also a 
reaction to calls on it to be a more responsible partner in the international system. In 
other words, while China is searching for commercial opportunities in Africa, at the 
same time, it wants to preserve a good image in the world. It does not want to be seen 
as the enhancer of genocides, authoritarian regimes, or supporter of despots in the 
African continent. China attempts therefore to skillfully balance weapons sales with 
an expanding peacebuilding agenda in order to silence some of the criticism directed 
at it by the West.
African nations can be categorized into two broad categories, those that are of 
geopolitical importance such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia. These are 
sometimes referred to as anchor states. They could also be referred to as sub-regional 
hegemons. In Africa, these four states exercise considerable influence within their 
regions. They are characterized by a substantial power base relative to others within 
the same region. They often have a stronger and larger military, a larger population, 
and larger geographic size, critical raw materials, and a strategic location, relative to 
the many small African nations. They sometimes aspire to regional hegemony and 
could become directly involved in the foreign policy and economic goals of major 
powers. In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, in particular generally 
possess many or all of the geo-strategic and geo-economic characteristics of sub-
regional influentials. For instance, has the geo-economic and geo-strategic importance 
of Nigeria correlated strongly with Chinese arms transfers to that country? Nigeria 
as a sub-regional hegemon or anchor state in West Africa receives regular military 
assistance and arms transfer from China. The military ties between Nigeria and China 
are regularly cemented by reciprocal visits at the level of Defense Ministers. In June 
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2004, Nigeria’s defense minister paid a state visit to China. China reciprocated by, 
among other things, agreeing to supply new combat jets to Nigeria, signing a contract 
with Nigeria’s defense ministry worth over $250 million to transfer 15 Chengdu F/FT-
7NI aircrafts in 2005 (Chau 2007). Transfers of sophisticated Chinese arms are usually 
followed by training of African military personnel on how to use them. Accordingly, 
in 2006 several Nigerian pilots traveled to China to undergo training on the use of the 
new aircrafts. In addition to the transfer of aircrafts, China also transferred air-to-air 
missiles, rockets, and anti-tank bombs, among others, worth $32 million. Between 
2004 and 2006 other arms transfer or military assistance agreements between China 
and Nigeria were worth over $70 million involving supplies of patrol boats, trainer 
and fighter aircraft, and military transports. There are several other examples of China 
cementing its relationship with African countries through military assistance. Among 
the many examples is China’s donation of $43 million worth of military equipment 
to Nigeria in October 2005. The equipment ranged from uniforms, communication 
technology, bullet proof helmets and vests, to computers, among other things (Enuka 
2011). China did not just transfer this equipment to Nigeria, but the transfer was later 
followed by several Chinese military experts whose mission was to train Nigerian 
military personnel on how to use the donated equipment.
Within the past decade, the 10 African countries with the highest level of 
military cooperation with China are Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Alessi and Xu 2015). Although the 
value of arms transfers from China to Africa could be described as modest compared to 
trade in oil and other commodities, military interactions are carried out through high 
level political delegations, while arms transfers and high level bilateral ties are used 
as instruments to help secure more economic access to critical raw materials. Since 
the end of the 1990s high level military delegations have been a regular occurrence 
between Beijing and several African countries. Of the 10 countries engaged in high 
levels of military cooperation with China, six of them are either suppliers of oil, gas, 
and other critical resources, or they have substantial Chinese commercial investments. 
This places China–Africa weapons transfers and military cooperation into two 
distinct dimensions: (1) countries with strategic minerals like Sudan and Nigeria, and 
South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (2) anchor states/regional 
influentials/sub-regional hegemons like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia, 
among others. In some cases there is an overlap between the two where geo-economic 
countries like Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa are also regional hegemons.
China’s Arms Sales Strategy to Africa
During the 1990s, Chinese weapons were considered to be substandard in firepower and offensive capability vis à vis the most simplistic, low-tech military armaments available, and limited to a defensive capacity, having only “nuisance 
value” (Bitzinger 1991). Consequently, Chinese weapons exports were limited to less 
than 10%. However, Chinese arms sales, especially in Africa, have increased. China 
has aggressively marketed its weapons to poorer and less technologically advanced 
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African states because of its inability to compete for sales in the more technologically 
advanced arms markets dominated by the US, Britain, France, and Russia.
China’s aggressive arms sales in African markets have placed it among 
the top five arms suppliers in the world. It currently has arms transfers deals or 
military relationships with several large African states such Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, as well as smaller states like the Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Burundi, and Sierra Leone, among others. One of the 
strategies utilized by China to make its arms sales attractive is the use of favorable 
financing. Many African countries cannot afford expensive, sophisticated weapons 
that fetch premium prices in the international marketplace. So China caters to this 
market, making its weapons affordable to cash poor countries through loans with 
very low interest rates or mineral rich countries willing to grant access to natural 
resources in a quid pro quo arrangement for supplying weapons. Consequently, the 
cost of Chinese made weapons remains below market, giving China the competitive 
edge through affordability, defined as inexpensive, rather than affordability defined as 
sophistication (Baker 2015). This translates into poor African countries having easy 
access to small, inexpensive, easy-to-use arms from China that have the potential 
to fuel eruptions of instability, increase political repression, and stifle economic 
development in recipient countries. This strategy by China has the dual effect of 
strengthening its ties with authoritarian leaders who need weapons to perpetuate their 
rule, and benefiting from sales to these authoritarian regimes thereby achieving its 
geo-economic objectives. China, stated differently, is using a “catch all” strategy in its 
dealings with African states. Moreover, China uses frequent and aggressive marketing 
tactics to capture market share in Africa, constantly promoting its military hardware 
at annual arms exhibits held in various states spanning the continent. The list of 
cooperating Chinese manufacturing firms is lengthy and includes companies such as 
China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC), China Electronics 
Technology Corporation (CETC) International, and China Aviation Industrial Base 
Corporation (CAIBC), as well as hundreds of smaller manufacturers. Apart from 
a strategy of affordability through attractive financing and payment options, China 
also ensures a wide array of arms and military hardware in its export inventory. 
Consequently, the scope of its offerings include small arms, armored vehicles, tactical 
and air defense weapons, naval ships, short range tactical ballistic missiles fighter jets, 
and communications surveillance and reconnaissance equipment. The list of available 
equipment also includes uniforms, boots and packs, as well as police items such as 
protective clothing and riot gear. Variation in wealth and military strength among 
African countries allows China to sell both small inexpensive, low-tech weapons as 
well more expensive and sophisticated military weapons. Consequently, transfers 
include battle tanks, guided missiles, air defense systems, and armored personnel 
carriers. Furthermore, China’s success in African markets is also enhanced by its long 
standing policy of non-interference. This policy has allowed China, on occasion, to sell 
weapons to opposing warring entities as was the case in the Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict. 
Similarly, Chinese weapons were used in the Darfurian genocide in the Sudan where 
Janjaweed militia systematically murdered, raped, and tortured civilians (Enuka 2011). 
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Once established, the arms transfer relationship between China and its African trading 
partner becomes reinforced by the recipient who will be in constant search of spare 
parts, ammunition supply, maintenance upgraded technology, and weapons training 
which may take place in Africa or China. Although Chinese arms sales in Africa is 
small relative to transfers with the more traditional suppliers and former colonial 
powers of Britain and France, as well as the leading arms suppliers of Russia and the 
US, Chinese arms sales in Africa attract particular attention and criticisms because: (1) 
its arms transfers to states of international concern such as Sudan and Zimbabwe; (2) 
its willingness to supply arms to any country in Africa with an ability to pay for them; 
and (3) the contradiction between its long-standing policy of non-interference and 
its practice of supplying arms to warring factions within a sovereign nation. Arming 
sectarian combatants within a sovereign nation is inherently interventionist in nature 
and unequivocally interference in a country’s internal affairs, especially when that 
country is in the throes of civil war, and where civilians have experienced gross human 
rights violations.
Chinese Arms: Negative Impact on African Conflicts
Although the value of arms transfers from China to Africa could be described as modest compared to trade in oil and other commodities, high-level military interaction and high-level political delegations have succeeded in enhancing 
China’s access to critical raw materials in Africa (Hyler 1992). Since the end of the 
1990s, military delegations have been a regular form of interaction between China 
and African countries. Arms transfers and military cooperation between China and 
African nations fall into two categories: (1) countries with strategic minerals like Sudan 
and Nigeria. These are geo-economically important countries to China in particular; 
and (2) key states like Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ethiopia, the DRC, Ghana, and 
Zimbabwe, among others. Generally, many African states find China an attractive arms 
trading partner because of its “no strings attached” approach to transfer. China does 
not make its weapons sales conditional on either human rights or democratic reforms.
China is currently a key supplier of conventional weapons in Africa where arms 
transfers there inevitably contribute to civil strife and carnage in more than a few local 
conflicts. It is generally alleged that the light weapons used in the massacres in eastern 
DRC were Chinese. There, children as young as 11 years old were given weapons by 
warlord Thomas Lubanga, and forced to take part in brutal ethnic fighting between 
2002 and 2003 (SAFERWORLD 2011). Moreover, according to Amnesty International 
reports, in February 2012, both Russian and Chinese supplied weapons fueled conflict 
in Sudan. In particular, arms transfers such as helicopter gunships, attack aircraft, air-
to-air ground rockets and armored vehicles, including ammunition, are responsible for 
serious human rights violations in Darfur, Sudan. Small arms of Chinese manufacture 
were used by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and government supported militia, 
including Sudan’s Popular Defense Force (PDF) to carry out atrocities in Darfur. 
While all of the carnage cannot be directly attributed to Chinese supplied arms as 
other countries were active in supplying weapons as well, it is important to note that 
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an estimated 70,000 people were displaced from eastern Darfur in 2011 due to ethnic 
attacks directed toward the Zarghawa community by the SAF and government-backed 
militias. Nevertheless, Amnesty International confirmed that Chinese-made weapons 
are found all over Sudan including Southern Kordofan (Deen 2012).
In December 2011, a SIPRI report found that by 2010 China was the foremost 
exporter of arms to Africa, a continent well known for gross human rights violations. 
Between 2006 and 2010 China had captured a full 25% of the market compared to only 
9% in the preceding 5 year period between 2001 and 2005 (SIPRI 2011). The reason for 
China’s leading role in arms transfers over traditional leaders like the US, Russia, France, 
Germany, and the UK, is the fact that it is willing to transfer military aid or make more 
attractive deals in exchange for critical resources rather than cash. Moreover, China 
is also prone to ignore UN sanctions against arms trade with countries like Sudan or 
Zimbabwe where severe human rights violations occur. However, some critics believe 
that China’s arms transfer role in Africa is exaggerated by Western countries noting 
that while China transfers largely small or light weapons, exporters like the US focus 
on quality transferring more sophisticated weapons, while Russia concentrates on 
quantity, making it the largest arms supplier to Africa. China takes much of the blame 
because it supplies small, low-tech, arms which are relatively inexpensive and easy 
to use and as a result, cause more destruction because of their scope and frequency 
of use compared to more sophisticated heavy weapons. Small or light arms are also 
responsible for civil unrest, atrocities, civilian deaths and involvement of child soldiers 
in rebellions. It is much easier to use a Chinese Type 56 rifle (China’s version of the 
Russian Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) assault rifle) than a Chinese aircraft which would 
require specialized training before it could be operated. China is viewed as playing 
a contradictory role where arms transfers and peace-keeping are concerned. For 
example, in the case of Sudan, China finally submitted to pressure to support UN 
Peacekeeping, but at the same time failed to suspend its arms sales which negatively 
impacted the regions of Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. China is, in other 
words, not interested in joining an arms embargo, or unilaterally ending arms sales in 
zones of conflict in Africa. China, one could argue, is a captive of its own foreign policy 
doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of another country (McPartland 2012).
Chinese exports to Sudan comprise of attack aircraft, munitions, and armored 
vehicles which are used against civilians. According to Amnesty International, following 
a raid at the Zam Zam camp for displaced civilians in Sudan in December 2011, 
ammunition was discovered bearing Chinese “41” and “71” manufacture codes, and 
(20) 06 and (20) 08 manufacture dates indicating that it was transferred to Darfur after 
the imposition of a UN arms embargo (Amnesty International 2012). China’s violation 
of the UN arms embargo on Sudan is evident throughout the country with Chinese 
made ammunition bearing its own manufacture codes discovered in Darfur and the 
South Kordofan regions in 2011. Using either Chinese or Russian-made weapons, the 
SAF has focused its attacks on both military targets and civilian populations. In 2009, 
Chinese-trained Guinean Commando units were responsible for the killing of about 
150 people during a protest against authoritarian rule in Conakry. In eastern DRC, 
Chinese trained Congolese troops were implicated in the killing of many innocent 
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civilians demonstrating that an increase in Chinese arms transfers to Africa is likely 
associated with more strife and bloodletting. 
While China is largely known for its sale of small weapons and the human 
carnage left in their wake in places like Sudan and the DRC, the Chinese are also 
active in supplying sophisticated weapons to oil-rich African states including armored 
vehicles, artillery, jet fighters, and training and transport aircraft. China’s sophisticated 
weapons transfers to Sudan include F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, light tanks, and anti-
aircraft systems. Zimbabwe was the recipient of nine J-7 fighter aircraft and six K-8 
trainer aircraft as well as 10 T-69 tanks and 30 T-59 tanks. Nigeria has expanded its 
assets with its US$251 million purchase of 15 F-7 fighter aircraft (Young 2016). And 
Angola ordered eight Su-27 fighter aircraft. Transfer of This sale corresponded very 
strongly with the fact that in 2005 Angola exported 17.5 million tons of crude oil 
to China becoming China’s largest oil supplier by 2006. Chinese arms transfers are 
strongly associated with oil and trade agreements with geo-economically important 
countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the DRC, among 
others. Angola is surpassed only by Sudan as China’s most geo-economic trading 
partner in Africa. Sudan has been the recipient of more Chinese made weapons and 
military equipment such as cargo trucks, battle tanks, and transport aircraft. These are 
in addition to mortars, rocket launchers, and air defense systems (Chang 2007). The 
level of sophistication of Chinese arms transferred to Sudan is strongly associated with 
Sudan’s geo-economic importance to China. China is the recipient of more than, or 
approximately, 90% of Sudan’s oil exports. China’s military presence in Sudan is quite 
substantial, with over 4000 Chinese military personnel in the country to protect its 
extensive and multi-billion dollar oil infrastructure investments (Human Rights First 
2008).
Zimbabwe is not oil rich, but endowed with a variety of critical minerals that 
China needs in its industrialization efforts. Accordingly, Zimbabwe has been the 
recipient of small arms and ammunition and sophisticated weaponry such as different 
types of armored fighting vehicles, and jet aircrafts. Moreover, China supplied the 
Mugabe regime instruments of opposition control such as radio-jamming equipment 
to disrupt opposition party broadcasts, and riot control equipment to suppress 
protests and demonstrations. In particular, oil-rich or strategic mineral endowed 
countries are the recipients of millions of dollars in Chinese investments, including 
military assistance or arms sales. The Republic of Congo is also rich in oil and supplies 
China with approximately 5% of its oil requirements. Congolese military forces are 
armed with major Chinese weapons such as the Type 59 tanks, Type 63 107-mm 
rocket launchers, Type 60 122-mm howitzers, and Type 59 130-mm cannons. This is 
in addition to various types of Chinese light weapons. Critics argue that China ignores 
the UN international arms embargo on Congo and continues to sell weapons to the 
country.
 Other geo-economic African countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, the 
DRC, and the like have received weapons systems such as the K-8 trainer aircraft, the 
J-7 fighter aircraft, training ship, missile fast craft with C802 ship-to-ship missiles. 
States that are not so geo-economic such as Mauritania, Zambia, Namibia, Eritrea, 
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Burundi, and Tanzania, all receive weapons systems from China. The transfer of 
weapons is inevitably accompanied by the dispatch of technical advisors by China, 
or the training of African military personnel in China. China in addition, maintains 
military attaches in some African nations such as Algeria, the DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia, Sudan, Tunisia, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe (Puska 2007). China supplies significant amounts of weapons to states 
with critical resources that maintain strong trading ties with China However, there are 
states such as Ghana or Uganda which are not significant in terms exporting critical 
resources to China, but have strong ties with China. This means that China is also 
using arms transfers as a means of enhancing its commercial profits.
Regardless of whether arms transfers have a negative or positive effect, they 
are nonetheless one of Beijing’s instruments of economic policy and cementing 
political ties with African nations. In Nigeria in particular, China willingly provides 
weapons to the Nigerian state in its battle against insurgents in the oil-rich Niger Delta. 
Naval patrol boats and arms have been readily supplied by China to help protect oil 
infrastructure in the Delta against rebel attacks. In 2006, China’s state-controlled 
oil firm, CNOOC negotiated an investment of over $2 billion for 45% of stake in a 
Nigerian offshore oil field. In addition, 3 months later China invested an additional 
$4 billion in oil infrastructure projects (Mahtani and White 2006). China continues 
to expand its oil investments in Nigeria, as well as forging closer military ties (arms 
transfers, military training, high level military cooperation, etc.) with the Nigerian 
military. In a similar fashion, Zimbabwe’s economic importance correlates strongly 
with its procurement of both small arms and more sophisticated weapons from China. 
Zimbabwe is endowed with critical minerals holding the second largest deposits of 
platinum as well as numerous other minerals including gold, copper, uranium, and 
ferrochrome. As a result of its attractiveness to China, it is able to get both small arms 
and more sophisticated military jets. The Mugabe regime is aware of the leverage it 
has over China because of its focus on cementing ties with countries of geo-economic 
importance. The Zimbabwean state takes advantage of this and is therefore able to 
procure all sorts of arms and other technology from China. The Zimbabwean air 
force is armed with K- jet aircrafts used in training jet fighter pilots and for use in 
low intensity warfare. The Zimbabwean military is also in possession of 12 FC-1 
fighter planes and several military vehicles worth over $200 million. In sum, Chinese 
weapons have been widely dispersed in Africa. A few examples are Chinese weapons 
in the hands of Chadean rebels fighting to overthrow the regime, or the use of Chinese 
weapons in wars in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as in many parts of eastern and 
central Africa.
Peacekeeping Efforts by China
China does not only transfer military equipment on a bilateral basis, but it has given monetary assistance to the OAU/AU Peace Fund in order to enhance the organization’s ability to resolve African conflicts. Accordingly, in 1999 it 
donated $100,000 to the OAU Peace Fund and again in 2000 an additional $200,000 
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was donated to the OAU Peace Fund (Rothberg 2015). China’s rationale was to show 
its full support for peacekeeping efforts by Africans themselves, as well as to express 
its admiration for the organization’s continued maintenance of peace and stability in 
the continent. China’s support of the OAU has been regular and generous, as well 
as varied in terms of funds and equipment. In 2003 and 2005, respectively, China 
donated $300,000 and $400,000 to the AU as an expression of its commitment to 
African peacekeeping efforts (Agubamah 2014). There is a marked increase in China’s 
donations to African peacekeeping efforts when one takes into account its 1999 and 
2000 donations of $100,000 and $200,000 respectively (Chau 2007). It has since 1990 
participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) several of them in African 
countries. It is currently, or has been, involved in the following UN Peacekeeping 
Operations:
1. Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, established in 1999) with 
China supplying 218 troops, and 12 military observers;
2. Ivory coast (UNOCL, established in 2003) with China supplying 
seven military observers;
3. Liberia (UNMIL, established in 2003) with China supplying 565 
soldiers, 18 police, and three military observers;
4. Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, established in 2000) with China 
supplying seven military observers; and
5. Western Sahara (MINURSO established in 1991) with China 
supplying 13 military observers.
 In China’s overall peacekeeping role in Africa, Chinese troops, or military 
observers are accordingly involved in humanitarian assistance, protection of human 
rights, national security reform, national police training, formation and restructuring 
of militaries, as well as functions of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, 
resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR). These functions are quite the opposite of the 
negative effects some of its arms transfers are having or have had on civil strife within 
these same countries where Chinese troops, police, or observers are operating. 
 Chinese contributions to peacekeeping in Africa are steady, consistent, and 
expanding. For example in the DRC it contributed 218 out of about 1,600 troops, in 
Liberia 565 out of about 14,000 troops, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea seven out of the 
202 military observers. Most of China’s peacekeeping personnel are military troops 
with expertise in various tasks and functions. While many play a defensive role of UN 
installations, personnel, and civilians, others have expertise in engineering, logistics, 
and health care. Those with engineering skills are often engaged in the construction 
of roads, bridges, camps, and digging of wells for water. Most of the troops that China 
contributes to peacekeeping are engineers, transportation experts, and medical staff. 
In the DRC, 175 of the 200 Chinese peace-keepers were engineers, in addition to 40 
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medical personnel (SAFERWORLD 2011). In other words, China’s view of peace-
keeping has a heavy focus on building infrastructure, providing medical care, and 
overall humanitarian assistance, as a way to promote its national interest, cement its 
economic relationship with African states, project an image of non-interference and 
a responsible major power in the international system (Fung 2016). This expanding 
role of China beyond the geo-economic objective of pursuing resources and profits is 
becoming a normal aspect of its foreign policy in the continent.
 While on the one hand China’s arms transfers are linked to civil strife and 
bloodletting, they are on the other hand used in peacekeeping operations. It could be 
argued that Chinese arms supplies to African peacekeeping troops involved in AU or 
UN peace-keeping operations play a positive role of improving peace and security. For 
example, Chinese supplied arms have been used in peace-keeping by Zambian troops 
in Sudan. China has consistently given its support to AU peacekeeping efforts and has 
made it part of its policy orientation towards Africa. In China’s 2003 FOCAC Addis 
Ababa Action Plan it was stated this way:
“We are resolved to step up cooperation and work together to support 
an even greater role of the United Nations, the African Union and other 
sub-regional organizations in Africa [It promised to] provide, within 
the limits of its capabilities, financial and material assistance as well 
as relevant training to the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union. In order to strengthen capacity of African states to undertake 
peacekeeping operations, we look forward to the strengthening of 
China’s cooperation with African states and sub-regional organizations 
in the areas of Logistics” (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Addis 
Ababa Action Plan, 2004–2006, 222).
 Again, in the 2009 FOCAC Meeting, China reiterated its willingness to 
continue support for AU Peace-keeping and conflict resolution. In January 2010, as 
part of China’s initiative, the UN Security Council deliberated on how best to maximize 
peacekeeping by the UN and sub-regional organizations. The Chinese Ambassador 
to the UN, Zhang Yesui, specifically underscored the need for the international 
community to aid African efforts at peace-keeping. He stated that:
“The African Union and sub-regional organizations in Africa have 
been committed to resolving hotspot issues in Africa through good 
offices and peacekeeping operations, but their efforts are constrained 
due to deficiencies in funding and capacity building. We support the 
establishment and deepening of the strategic partnership between 
the United Nations and the African Union in maintaining peace and 
security in Africa” (HE Ambassador, Zhang Yesui, UNSC 2010).
 
 China’s previous rigid opposition to UN Peace-Keeping has softened since 
the late 1990s. It realized that Chapter VII UN Peace-keeping had become outdated 
Is China Playing a Contradictory Role in Africa? 
94
when examined in the light of situations in war ravaged countries of the DRC and 
Liberia in 2003. The brutality, carnage, and atrocities associated with the wars of the 
mid-1990s to early 2000s, made it necessary not just to limit peace-keeping to self-
defense but rather to occasionally engage in peace-enforcement expressed in rapid 
and effective intervention to save civilian lives and even prevent further escalation of 
conflict. However, China’s geo-economic interests at times stand in the way of allowing 
UN interventions in all countries. For instance, in 2006 China did not give its support 
for UN peace-keeping expansion in Sudan under UNMIS. It was only after a great 
deal of pressure from the international community, and its likely negative effect on the 
Olympic Games hosted by China in 2008, that it acquiesced to the wishes of the United 
Nations. At the same time, its contribution to peace-keeping in terms of numbers of 
troops and financial contribution surpassed that of the other great powers. In 2010 
China’s UN peace-keeping contribution reached $300 million (SAFERWORLD 2011). 
By 2010 the majority of Chinese peace-keepers were deployed in African countries 
such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, and others.
 Influenced by its non-interference policy, China’s peacekeeping troops largely 
play a “supportive role” of building infrastructure, providing medical, logistical, and 
transport support. China plays a very intensive and extensive peace-keeping role in the 
DRC, but at the same time it is a purveyor of small arms that are responsible for a great 
deal of the ethnic carnage, especially in eastern DRC. For instance, within MONUC 
China takes the lead role in military observer functions. China is so serious about 
peace-keeping that it has a Civilian Peace-Keeping Police Training Center to train 
Chinese police officers to be deployed to UN missions. It also established a Peace-
Keeping Affairs Office in December 2001. In 2009, it further set up a new peace-
keeping center for the training of Chinese military peace-keepers. 
 China has been heavily involved in peacekeeping activities even in a non-geo-
economic country like Liberia. The UN Mission in Liberia established in 2003 focused 
on disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) with the 
specific objectives of security sector reform, national police training, and a restructured 
Liberian army. The Chinese peace-keepers are mainly involved in infrastructure 
development and medical care. In July 2010 China deployed peace-keepers in Liberia 
numbered 585 strong, the fifth highest behind Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and 
Ghana. The Chinese provide the main source of transportation for the peace-keepers. 
They transport not just peacekeepers, but fuel, water, and other essential items around 
Liberia. In the area of infrastructure rehabilitation, Chinese engineers have been 
busy upgrading roads and bridges, and with the maintenance of runways at airports 
around the country. By 2010, Chinese engineers along with other peace-keeping forces 
had rehabilitated hundreds of miles of road networks and bridges. In medical work, 
Chinese medical staff have provided basic health care to several town and villages, and 
also assisted in building local medical capacity (UNMIL 2010). Chinese police have 
also worked very hard on beefing up community security through the training of local 
Liberian police to effectively combat armed robbery, riots, and violent protests. The 
Chinese contingent has been especially commended for its efficiency and effectiveness 
in Liberia.
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 China is actively involved in peace-keeping in Africa for a number of reasons. 
Since peace-keeping is a multilateral effort, it is a way for China to show that it 
supports cooperative solutions to global security problems, especially ones that are 
relevant to Africa (Richardson 2011). Involvement at the UN level helps China boost 
its influence not just within this world body, but also among African nations. In 
other words, peace-keeping helps boost China’s image as a responsible country that is 
actively engaged in promoting a peaceful and harmonious world. Its focus on Africa 
creates a positive image of itself among African nations at the UN and beyond (Fung 
2015). With peace-keeping it enhances its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy in the 
international system. It has become the only Security Council member that does not 
hesitate to send its peacekeeping troops to troubled spots like the DRC, Sudan, or 
Liberia, among others (Yao 2016). Its willingness to deploy troops in African states 
counters the negative image created by its arms sales to despotic regimes and zones of 
conflict. Additionally, its active involvement in aid, trade, investment, and peacekeeping 
in Africa increases its geo-economic presence all over the continent. According to a 
report by SAFERWORLD in January 2011:
“In some more general ways, peace-keepers do serve China’s economic 
interests: they promote peace in countries where Chinese banks and 
commercial actors have made significant investments and have an 
interest in restoring stability. They also improve bilateral relations 
with the governments that have given their consent to peacekeeping 
missions” (76).
 China is even using peacekeeping to interact with other militaries around the 
world within African nations. In Liberia it interacted with Indian, Pakistani, Nigerian, 
and other military troops. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf commended 
Chinese peace-keepers for not only enhancing the peace and security of Liberia, 
but for also contributing to its postwar reconstruction in the form of infrastructure 
development and helping to build medical capacity in the country.
 China’s involvement in peacekeeping in developing countries helps provide a 
sense of global legitimacy to peace-keeping operations since it is the only great power 
that is not viewed as being under the influence of the US and other Western powers. 
The Western powers are often viewed by many developing countries as simply out to 
enhance and even impose their agenda on smaller or weaker nations. It is perhaps 
only in Sudan that China is not viewed as legitimate or neutral because of its close 
geo-economic ties and extensive vested interests with the Khartoum regime. Another 
weakness in China’s peacekeeping role is the fact that it is rigidly state-centric in its 
peacekeeping approach. Beijing’s belief that only the state or incumbent regime can 
be legitimate alienates rebel factions or opposition groups within countries at war. It 
is not surprising that Chinese workers have been the victims of kidnapping and even 
massacres by rebel groups in conflict areas. China tends to deviate from guidelines 
set by the rest of the world regarding aid, trade, and investment. It is the same with 
its approach to peacekeeping. For instance, China is rigidly opposed to any form 
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of imposition on countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction, especially an 
externally imposed and predetermined model of political and economic governance. 
According to Chinese scholars what is most important is not just the promotion of 
democratic governance, but the reduction of poverty and ending unemployment. The 
rationale is that poverty is associated with instability therefore the long-term objective 
of peace-building must be to ensure human security by focusing on alleviating both 
poverty and unemployment.
 
Summary and Conclusions
China’s engagement with Africa is multipronged and predicated on a geo-strategy of geopolitical objectives with the primary focus on strengthening political ties with all states in Africa, and geo-economic objectives with the 
principal focus on access to Africa’s resources. Both objectives are partly achieved by 
the seemingly contradictory policies of arms sales which generate profits for China, 
produce dependence by African states, and thereby enhance stronger political ties, and 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding activities by China which equally strengthen political ties 
with African states, but also give China a good image in the world. It is rather obvious 
that one of the anomalies of China’s foreign policy toward Africa is the contradiction 
between its arms transfers to Africa on the one hand, and its peacekeeping activities 
on the other. There is a direct clash between monetary support for the AU, deployment 
of troops to achieve peace in areas of civil strife and interfering in Africa’s conflicts 
through arms transfers. Chinese small arms are used in many of Africa’s wars. During 
the Darfur “genocide” weapons used to commit atrocities against the people of Darfur 
were supplied by China. The irony is that the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) included as many as 446 of the 900 soldiers, 9 of the roughly 660 police, 
and 14 of the 599 military observers. Similarly, during the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea China was known to have supplied both sides with weapons. However, the 
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) established in July 2000, 
included a Chinese contribution of 7 out of the 202 military observers. Moreover, 
China is accused of supplying weapons to the Democratic Republic of Congo, while at 
same time contributing troops to the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) in its support of 
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR). 
China contributed 218 of the 16,594 soldiers and 12 of the 713 military observers in 
that conflict.
 While China is not the only country to support both conflict resolution and 
weapons transfers in war-torn societies, its small arms have nonetheless contributed 
to protracted wars and bloodletting. In fact, China has been implicated in the Ivorian, 
Liberian, and Sierra Leonean conflicts because of the role played by Chinese firms 
smuggling small arms to rebels and mercenaries thereby prolonging and even 
exacerbating those conflicts. Arms transfers to developing countries never contribute 
to peace. Therefore one can conclude that China’s non-interference policy is calculated 
to: (1) distance itself from the colonial legacy of the Western countries in Africa; (2) 
camouflage the aggressive pursuit of African resources and deflect attention from such 
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aggressive behavior while presenting an image of China being different from the West; 
and (3) shroud the fact that Chinese military personnel are ready to do battle and 
have even done so in Sudan, the Niger Delta of Nigeria, and the DRC. These points 
make China’s longstanding policy of non-interference in Africa tenuous. In particular, 
China’s arms transfer and peacekeeping policy in Africa is schizophrenic because it 
supports the AU peacekeeping efforts with funds, while at the same time supplying 
weapons to oppressive authoritarian regimes, effectively contributing to small arms 
proliferation through its modestly priced weapons, militarizing the African continent.
 The danger in China–Africa relations is the fact that China could end up being 
a role model for the continent furthering human rights violations that could escalate 
into civil strife. Perhaps the most important concerns related to China’s peacekeeping 
activities in Africa is reconciling its historical record with two fundamental concepts 
found in the definition peacekeeping; protection and promotion of basic human rights 
for individuals, the core values and primary goals of UN peacekeeping operations.
 China has not fared well on the international scene, earning criticism for its 
suppression of human rights defenders, control, intimidation, and harassment of 
lawyers that take politically sensitive cases or seek redress of abuses of power at the 
hands of government officials, ethnic discrimination, and severe religious repression 
of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang, mass rehousing and relocation policies in Tibet, and 
suppression of Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central Movement,” just to name a few.
 In Africa, China is already playing out its human rights violations in places 
like Sierra Leone, where a mass and forced relocation of employees was carried out 
by the nation’s largest mining employers. The families of the workers were forced 
to settle in an arid area that does not support productive agriculture. The reports of 
forced labor in mining sectors, poor safety conditions, long work schedules of up to 
18 hour shifts, and anti-union activities enforced by Chinese companies in countries 
like Eritrea, Zambia, and Sudan, among others. The UN often points out that while 
China repeatedly calls for political solutions to conflict situations in African states, as 
an influential member of the UN Human Rights Council, it regularly votes to prevent 
scrutiny of serious human rights abuses in the continent and around the world. The 
persistence of human rights abuses in a country eventually results in political instability 
and human insecurity in all its various forms.
 China’s domestic policy emphasizing a “harmonious society” has been 
incorporated into its foreign policy toward Africa. What began as a policy to reduce 
inequalities and social injustice has now taken on a new meaning. “Stability at all 
costs” has become the overarching objective. Observers claim the government uses 
the ideology to justify suppression of dissent and tightening controls on information 
inside China. Extending and superimposing that ideology in Africa, China is assisting 
some African regimes like the one in Ethiopia in controlling and monitoring the use 
of the internet by its people. China has also helped the Zimbabwean regime of Mugabe 
in jamming the radio broadcasts of its opposition party. 
 While China seems to have made impressive strides in African security and 
peacekeeping activities through its financial and military assistance to the African 
Union and UN peacekeeping activities, its priority in Africa is still geo-economic 
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interests or economic ties with African states. Because bilateral economic activities 
are the greatest focus of China in Africa, peacekeeping and security issues have not 
yet been discussed with sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. Outright or significant commitment 
by China for a more effective African Union or an African security force may be slow in 
coming. However, some Chinese scholars have proposed the idea of an African Peace 
Fund as a key condition for more effective African peacekeeping efforts. China would 
most likely prefer to work with the UN in its efforts to contribute to African peace and 
security. While African sub-regional organizations and the AU can collectively put 
pressure on China to do more in the area of security and peace in Africa, it appears 
that China will continue to improve its record on peacekeeping via the UN and its 
peacekeeping missions in Africa as a way of counteracting the accusations that it is 
flooding Africa with small arms that are used in many of the ongoing conflicts.
 The current levels of China’s peacekeeping activities in Africa have had a 
positive impact because of the level of infrastructure development and medical work 
performed by Chinese peacekeepers. However, some of the potential obstacles to an 
expanded Chinese peacekeeping effort would be: (1) the issue of what constitutes 
legitimate intervention; and (2) China’s role in arms transfers that help fuel conflicts in 
contrast to its peacekeeping activities. Positive developments are that China is becoming 
more flexible with regard to the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping interventions, and it is 
at times even advocating within the UN Security Council use of peace-enforcement in 
situations of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian crisis.
 While China supplies a significant number of weapons to states with critical 
resources with which it maintains strong trading ties, there are also states such as 
Ghana or Uganda which are not significant in terms of exporting critical resources 
to China, but maintain strong military ties with China. This means that China is also 
using arms transfers as a means of enhancing its commercial profits. Arms transfers 
whether they generate positive or negative effects are simply part of the multipronged 
diplomatic strategy of China toward Africa. Other dimensions of China’s multiple 
diplomacy are in the areas of aid, trade, investment, health education, and culture. 
The arms transfer sector is increasing in scope but still lags far behind the aid, trade, 
and investment strategy. Arms transfers therefore, play the dual role of consolidating 
relationships/ties with African states, and to some extent, acting as a commercial end 
in itself.
 Finally, the argument can be made that because African armies are poorly 
equipped and underfunded, Chinese military aid is beneficial to them because it helps 
uphold the internal integrity, if not territorial integrity of African states. However, on 
a more critical level, the virtual lack of interstate wars among African states results in 
regimes using weapons for self-preservation purposes. Such was the case in Guinea. 
Overall, China is likely to expand and intensify its military relationships with Africa 
via arms transfers, military attaches, high level military exchanges and meetings, and 
even joint military exercises.
 On a more critical reflection, the African security implications of China’s 
seemingly contradictory role in Africa is manifested in a rhetoric of non-interference 
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and peace-building, contradicted by the proliferation of light and inexpensive weapons 
implicated in some of the most serious cases of bloodletting on the continent. It could 
be argued that as China widens its engagement with African states it will continue to 
consolidate military agreements, and engage in more arms transfers on a continent that 
already has a strong potential for the eruption of more conflicts related a combination 
of gross inequalities, ethnic rivalry and diversity, and the absence of the rule of law, as 
well as a strong culture of coups, civil wars, and other forms of civil strife. While it is 
true that China is not the only great power supplying weapons to African states, the 
affordability of Chinese weapons enables protracted African wars, and their continued 
proliferation within the continent. This is more likely to be the case in both the near and 
distant future because China often does not adhere to UN arms embargoes, sanctions 
against African states, or their diplomatic isolation. Its preoccupation to consolidate 
its diplomatic ties, and strengthen its partnerships with African states means it often 
takes an approach different from those of Western states.
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